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of the start of accession negotiations with Cyprus and
at least some Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) in early 1998. It will be questioned whether
the cohesion policy in an enlarged Union can remain
an important facilitator of European integration.
Regional and social disparities in the EU: trends
and causes
In general, growth at EU level is an important facilitator
for narrowing regional disparities in output and income.
One could say that in times of overall economic
prosperity the so-called ‘catching-up process’ of the
relatively poorer countries seems to proceed more
smoothly, while this apparently becomes more difficult
during periods of economic slowdown. A second
general trend is that this catching-up process is clearly
a long-term development, which has particular
implications for the time needed to bring the CEECs
up to the level of the current poorest EU Member
States. The particular situation of the CEECs will be
considered below.
Looking first at the present four poorest EU
countries, one notes that between 1983 and 1995
Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal made, on average,
considerable improvements in their performance
compared with that of the other Member States. The
average per capita GDP of these 4 countries stood at
66% of the Community average in 1983 and rose to
74% by 1995. However, there are considerable
differences in the progress made by these countries
individually. Ireland recorded the highest growth and
managed to reduce its gap to close to 90% of the EU
average in 1995. Economic growth was also above
Community average for Spain and Portugal, whereas
the economic performance of Greece has been more
modest, with average growth remaining clearly below
the Community figure.3
The picture becomes more complicated when
disparities at regional level are considered. Not
surprisingly, the disparities across the Union then
become much more pronounced and tend to show a
centre-periphery pattern. The evolution at regional
level has in fact been less promising. The gap between
the richest and poorest regions in terms of GDP
remained virtually stable over the period 1983-1993,
while the unemployment gap has actually widened.4
One of the main challenges for the cohesion policy
is not so much to identify disparities but rather to try
to explain them and thereby determine their causes. A
whole set of different but related factors all come into
Introduction
Cohesion policy has gradually been introduced into
the set of Community activities and, since the
Maastricht Treaty, strengthening economic and social
cohesion, has formally been defined as one of the
objectives of the European Union. However, achieving
this objective has also become more difficult over time
as the Union expanded. The forthcoming eastward
expansion of the Union further complicates the issue
since it will involve a large number of relatively poor
and agricultural countries. In its ‘Agenda 2000’,
published in July 1997, the European Commission
presented, among other things, its proposals for reform
of the cohesion policy in anticipation of the next
enlargement.1 The challenge facing the EU will be to
make the cohesion policy more effective while
budgetary means remain broadly unchanged and the
number of beneficiary countries increases. All
ingredients seem to be present for an extremely difficult
political bargaining exercise starting this autumn.
Interestingly, this bargaining will be conducted by
current Member States only, even though it will
certainly affect prospective new members.
It has to be stressed from the outset that the concept
of ‘economic and social cohesion’ is rather vague and
ill-defined in the literature. The Treaty on European
Union refers in Article 130a to the aim of promoting
an overall harmonious development, in particular
through a reduction of ‘disparities between the levels
of development of the various regions and the
backwardness of the least-favoured regions, including
rural areas’. As argued below, economic and social
cohesion is primarily a political target; the economic
rationale behind the cohesion policy can be seriously
questioned. Molle describes cohesion as ‘the degree to
which disparities in social and economic welfare
between different regions or groups within the
Community are politically and socially tolerable’.2
Obviously, the internal market and several common
policies (e.g. competition, environment, research and
development, etc.) all have a direct or indirect impact
on internal cohesion, and should therefore be taken
into account when evaluating the overall cohesion
situation. However, this is not the aim of this article,
which will only assess the main cohesion instruments,
the EU Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund.
Subsequently, the ‘Agenda 2000’ proposals on
economic and social cohesion will be analysed in view20
play, including physical infrastructure endowments
(transport, energy, telecommunications), human
resources (qualified workforce, training facilities),
innovative capacities, research and development, etc.
While the importance of innovation and industrial
research is undoubted, Begg et al. noted that changes
in these factors are much more difficult to achieve than
in the upgrading of infrastructure.5 Not surprisingly, in
the past the emphasis of the EU regional policy was
indeed on infrastructural developments. Only since
the end of the 1980s have actions become more
diversified, including more attention devoted to the
development of human resources.
In any event, the very small budget allocated for
cohesion policy severely limits the possibilities of
conducting an effective policy. The entire EU budget
represents currently less than 1.2% of its gross national
product (GNP), with the so-called ‘structural
operations’ taking up almost one third of that. The
famous MacDougall Report published by the European
Commission in 1977 anticipated that fiscal transfers
from richer to poorer regions would play a central role
in the EU once the integration process would approach
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The report
recommended that the Community budget should rise
to 2-2.5% of Community GDP in the ‘pre-federal
stage’ and to 5-7% of GDP when real political federation
emerges.6 Following the accession of Spain and
Portugal in 1986 and the plans to establish the Internal
Market, agreement was reached at the Brussels
European Council in February 1988 on a major reform
of the Structural Funds, including a doubling of the
budget in real terms between 1987 and 1993.7 However,
despite the considerable budgetary increase that has
subsequently occurred, the total size of the Structural
Funds and the Cohesion Fund (created in 1993) remains
very modest, representing at present less than 0.46%
of the overall EU GNP.
Reforms of the Structural Funds in 1988 – Revision
in 1993
The Structural Fund reforms of 1988 undoubtedly
constituted a major shift in the EU cohesion policy.
Although the doubling of the funds may have to be
nuanced (doubling from a low starting point), a number
of key principles have been formalised or introduced
which currently continue to govern the policy. One of
the key principles was that the funding would be
concentrated on a number of priority Objectives, of
which Objective 1 became the most important as it
addresses the problems of the less developed regions
(i.e. those regions with a GDP per capita of less than
75% of the EU average). It was anticipated that around
80% of the European Regional Development Fund
resources would go to the poorest regions. Objective
2 was targeted to regions suffering from industrial
decline, and Objective 5b was devoted to rural areas.
Secondly, instead of spending funds on small,
individual and often overlapping projects, support
would become more coordinated through the
introduction of multi-annual integrated programmes.
Thirdly, the partnership principle called for all parties
concerned (European Commission, national, regional
and local authorities, etc.) to be involved in all
programming stages. This resulted in some cases in
direct communication channels being established
between the Commission and the regional authorities,
thereby bypassing the national level. Finally, a long-
standing principle was retained, i.e. the additionality
principle requiring that European funding should be in
addition to funding from national or regional sources.
When the Structural Fund regulations were revised
in 1993, some modifications were made in the definition
of the Objectives, the programming procedures and
the process of verifying Member States’ compliance
with the additionality principle. Prior to this, the
Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 had
agreed to a further budgetary increase for structural
funding, particularly for the 4 poorest countries.
Interestingly, when comparing the first programming
period 1989-1993 and the current period 1994-1999, it
can be seen that there has been a notable extension of
area coverage of the Structural Funds, rising from
43.5% to 52.2% of total EU population (the population
living in Objective 1 regions grew from 21.7% to
26.6%).8 This increase has partly absorbed the
additional resources made available to the Structural
Funds, thereby keeping the average aid per capita in
the EU roughly unchanged. This development seems
to confirm that strong political bargaining took place
at the time when the regulations had to be adopted and
the eligibility criteria applied. It is generally recognised
by the European Commission that the current
distribution of funds limits the effectiveness of the
cohesion policy.9
A second problem is that the procedures applied
are overly complex and bureaucratic. In the current
programming period, it became possible for regions to
conclude a so-called ‘Single Programming Document’
aimed at shortening and simplifying the entire
procedure. However, this change has not provided a
comprehensive answer to the continuing problems
encountered by operators when submitting and
implementing programmes supported by the Structural
Funds. Part of the problem rests at Member State level.
In some cases, it apparently takes a long time before
the European funds end up with the actual recipients
at regional or local level.
Thirdly, a substantial amount of the available
funds has, in reality, not (yet) been used or only with
substantial delays. The rates of underutilisation of
Structural Funds are indeed remarkably high.10 The so-
called absorption capacity of the Member States seems
to be limited, which is partly due to the overall
restrictive budgetary policies governments have
adopted in recent years as a preparation for EMU.11
However, in other cases Member States have also
failed to develop suitable programmes or have
encountered problems in the implementation phase
which delayed fund spending.21
Fourthly, the additionality principle continues to
pose problems regarding the verification of Member
States’ usage of Structural Funds. Despite the 1993
revisions of the Structural Fund regulations, the
Commission encounters considerable methodological
difficulties when verifying that European funds have
not been used by Member States to replace national
funds.
Finally, Structural Fund spending has been
inadequately controlled and has been the object of
several fraud cases. The European Court of Auditors
has repeatedly referred to this problem in its annual
reports. This particular issue, together with the high
underutilisation of funds, are likely to provide some
Member States with strong arguments to oppose any
substantial budgetary increase for the new
programming period after 1999.
In view of the abovementioned shortcomings, there
are good reasons to further reform the EU cohesion
policy. The fact that a large group of countries from
Central and Eastern Europe is waiting to join the EU
only reinforces the pressure to undertake reforms. In
fact, the prospect of eastern enlargement puts the
entire issue in a completely different perspective.
Some Member States currently regarded as relatively
poor might find themselves in the opposite category
following enlargement. This immediately raises a
number of politically sensitive questions, in particular
regarding the position of current cohesion countries
towards the eastern enlargement.
Before looking further at the enlargement issue,
however, one important point must be added here.
Several authors analysing the EU cohesion policy on
the basis of international relations theories have argued
that the policy is (partly) based on the idea of side-
payments or concessions made at regular intervals to
some Member States in order to further the European
integration process. As such, the design and subsequent
evolution of the Structural Funds can be seen as
facilitators of European integration; in particular, the
creation of the ERDF in 1975 following the accession
of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark; the
1988 reforms which were clearly linked to the southern
enlargement and the Internal Market programme; and
finally, the creation of the Cohesion Fund in the
Maastricht Treaty as a concession to the poorer
countries to help them prepare for EMU. This is an
important element, since it helps to explain exactly
why the overall budget for the cohesion policy remains
tiny. For the poorer countries, the Structural Funds
relate to a substantial part of their GDP,12 but
nevertheless the cohesion policy does not seem able to
significantly speed up the convergence process.
Therefore, Allen argues that the ‘EU economy could
probably survive without the redistributive effect of
the Structural Funds. But it is not clear that the EU
system of governance could survive’.13 In view of the
eastern enlargement, it then becomes rather uncertain
whether the Structural Funds could continue to operate
as a sort of glue for further integration. Indeed, the
challenges linked to this enlargement seem to be of a
rather different magnitude, making it doubtful whether
past practices can be reapplied to digest this huge
operation of eastern enlargement.
CEECs and the EU cohesion policy
In 1995, the 10 applicant CEECs had a GDP per capita
of 32% of the EU average, ranging from 18% for
Latvia to 59% for Slovenia.14 Under current rules, all
applicants would immediately become eligible for
Objective 1 assistance upon accession.15 However,
their accession would also result in a modest lowering
of the average EU level, thereby possibly disqualifying
some of the current Objective 1 beneficiaries. In any
event, considering the low development level of the
CEECs, the countries appear to need large amounts of
money to accelerate their growth rates and raise their
standards of living to a level comparable to the EU
average.
For the applicant countries, the prospect of
eventually receiving support from the Structural Funds
undoubtedly constitutes one of their motivations for
seeking membership. In ‘Agenda 2000’, however, the
Commission clearly expresses doubts as to the
administrative capacity of the new members to manage
the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. In all 10
opinions on the Central and Eastern European
applicants, the Commission stresses the need for
creating or improving adequate administrative
structures in order to be able to effectively use and
financially control the Structural Funds. In fact, the
applicants do not have a tradition of conducting regional
policies, since for the planned economies ‘regional
policy was essentially the outcome of national sectoral
plans which were the basis of decisions on the locations
of investment, production and settlement’.16
Consequently, the regional administrative level was
simply nonexistent in most of the countries. Only
recently have steps been taken in some of the countries
aimed at reforming the territorial administrative
structures.
One of the major obstacles currently hindering the
development of regional policies in the CEECs is
obviously the lack of finances. This relates to one key
question regarding where to place priority, i.e. whether
to promote primarily national or regional development.
In recent years, the Commission has encouraged the
involvement of regional and local authorities in the
EU cohesion policy. However, it is uncertain whether
this approach can be equally applied to the poorer
CEECs where regional administrations are only in the
process of being established. In ‘Agenda 2000’, the
European Commission argues, in fact, that the
definition of geographical priorities is not necessary in
the medium term considering the overall low
development level and the small size of most of the
applicant CEECs. Therefore, the Commission regards
combating the increase in internal disparities as part of
the overall aim of reducing the development gap
between the applicants and the EU average.22
Agenda 2000 proposals on economic and social
cohesion
The Commission’s ‘Agenda 2000’ proposals for the
new financial perspective suggest that the overall
ceiling of the EU finances be maintained at 1.27% of
the EU GNP in 2000-2006. The largest part of the
expenditures would continue to be for the common
agricultural policy (around 44%). Subsequently, the
Commission stresses the great political importance it
attaches to economic and social cohesion, even more
so for the enlarged Union. Due to budgetary constraints,
however, the Commission finds it impossible for the
structural operations to go beyond the upper limit of
0.46% of GNP set for 1999. As a result, for the period
2000-2006 the Commission proposes that ECU 275
billion be made available for structural operations
(around 37% of total EU expenditures), i.e.:
• ECU 230 billion for the current 15 Member States:
i.e. ECU 210 billion for the Structural Funds, of
which about two thirds would be earmarked for
Objective 1 regions, and ECU 20 billion for the
Cohesion Fund;
• ECU 45 billion for the new Member States,
including pre-accession aid of ECU 7 billion from
2000 onwards and their eventual participation in
programmes supported by the Structural Funds and
the Cohesion Fund. The proposed financial
perspective assumes that the first eastward
enlargement would take place in 2002.
Not surprisingly, the general approach taken is one
whereby support to current beneficiaries will be more
concentrated, involving phasing-out arrangements for
some regions and a gradual phasing in of the new
Member States. In fact, the Commission proposes that
total transfers from the Structural Funds and the
Cohesion Fund to both present and future Member
States be limited to 4% of their GDP, effectively
putting an overall limit on available support.
In order to increase the effectiveness of the policy,
it would be necessary to concentrate the financial
means on a reduced number of Objectives, limit the
coverage of the Structural Funds to 35%-40% of the
total EU population, simplify the management
procedures and improve the evaluation mechanisms.
Compared with the current 7 Objectives, only 3
Objectives would be retained for the new programming
period.
Objective 1 would continue to receive the highest
priority as it concerns the poorest regions, with the
eligibility threshold remaining at less than 75% of the
Community average in terms of per capita GDP.
However, the proposals for several cases include a
backdoor which would require deviating from these
general criteria. As such, with respect to current
beneficiaries which will exceed the threshold,
transitional arrangements would be required to
gradually phase out Community support to these
regions; the outermost regions would be treated as
Objective 1 regions on an ad hoc basis; and special
arrangements would have to be devised for the sparsely
populated Nordic regions currently eligible under
Objective 6. Although at this stage the Commission
proposals do not provide many details on these possible
deviations, they risk infringing the concentration
principle.
The new Objective 2, concentrating on economic
and social restructuring, would resemble parts of the
present Objectives 2 and 5a. It would focus on economic
diversification for certain areas, with the emphasis on
support for small and medium-sized enterprises,
innovation, vocational training, local development
potential, environmental protection and urban issues.
For those regions not covered by Objectives 1 and
2, support would be available for the development of
human resources under the new Objective 3 aimed at
helping Member States to adapt and modernise their
systems of education, training and employment.
The Commission recommends that the Cohesion
Fund be maintained, allowing the transfer of support
to those Member States having a GNP per capita of less
than 90% and helping them to prepare for EMU. The
Commission now proposes that participants in the
third phase of EMU which have a per capita GNP
below the threshold should continue to receive
assistance from the Cohesion Fund for at least another
3 years, provided they comply with the requirements
of the Stability and Growth Pact.
Evaluation
With ‘Agenda 2000’, the Commission has officially
launched the debate on further reform of the EU
cohesion policy. The prospect of poor and agricultural
CEECs entering the Union has put additional pressure
on the current Member States to undertake reforms.
For the new 2000-2006 financing agreement, the
Commission proposes some ECU 275 billion for
‘structural operations’, of which around 84% would be
reserved for the current Member States. This contrasts
sharply with the evidently high level of support the
CEECs will need to close their development gap with
the current EU members. In fact, the proposals
anticipate only a very gradual participation of the
CEECs in the cohesion policy. In ‘Agenda 2000’, the
Commission has stressed its concerns about the
administrative capacity of the applicant countries to
manage the European funds. It is therefore of the
utmost importance to convince the applicants that
receiving European money should not be looked at as
a main objective for becoming an EU member, but
rather to encourage them to identify strategies regarding
the manner in which eventual European financial
support could be instrumental to their overall economic
development.
In the meantime, current Member States will fight
a tough battle, in the coming months, over the new
Structural Fund regulations. The ‘Agenda 2000’
proposals do not envisage any major reforms in terms
of priorities for the cohesion policy. The reduction
from 7 to 3 Objectives seems merely a regrouping of23
current Objectives, and as such it is uncertain whether
this in itself would lead to more concentration of
resources. If the idea is indeed to focus, for instance,
on the poorest regions, then it remains to be seen how
this can be reconciled with the absorption problems
that some of the current beneficiary countries have
encountered in recent years. In fact, more concentration
would even imply increasing the level of support to the
poorest regions.
Moreover, the new budget proposals for the
cohesion policy seem to indicate that, in the future,
financial resources will not be distributed among the
Member States purely on the basis of ‘objective’
criteria but rather continue to be allocated as a result
of political deals. The eastern enlargement will
therefore be a good test case for understanding how
Member States interpret the cohesion objective of the
Treaty in practice.
RÉSUMÉ
Par la publication “Agenda 2000” en juillet 1997, la
Commission européenne a voulu ouvrir un débat sur
les réformes futures de la politique européenne de
cohésion. Depuis le début des années quatre-vingt, la
cohésion économique et sociale a acquis une
importance politique et budgétaire grandissante au
niveau européen. La politique de cohésion a permis au
processus d’intégration européenne de réaliser des
avancées, telles que le Marché intérieur et l’Union
économique et monétaire.
Depuis les réformes des Fonds structurels en 1988,
le but poursuivi était de concentrer les ressources sur
un certain nombre d’Objectifs prioritaires. Dans la
pratique, il s’est cependant avéré difficile de mettre en
oeuvre ce principe-clé, dès lors que les Etats membres
livraient une dure bataille au Conseil pour s’assurer
leur part du budget, ce qui déboucha sur un
éparpillement considérable des moyens financiers sur
tout le territoire de l’UE.
Le destin de la politique de cohésion dans la
perspective des élargissements prochains vers l’Est
reste incertain. L’adhésion d’un grand nombre de
pays agricoles relativement pauvres d’Europe centrale
et orientale pose d’immenses défis à l’Union dans son
ensemble et à la politique de cohésion en particulier.
Les propositions que la Commission formule à cet
égard dans “Agenda 2000” n’appellent pas de leurs
voeux une réforme majeure de la politique de cohésion.
En fait, les 3 Objectifs des activités des Fonds
structurels qui seraient retenus semblent être un simple
réemballage des 7 Objectifs actuels. L’accord de
financement proposé pour la période 2000-2006
envisage uniquement une incorporation progressive
de certains nouveaux membres, la plus grande partie
du budget de cohésion restant attribuée aux Etats
membres actuels. En tant que tel, l’objectif de cohésion
ancré dans le Traité sur l’Union européenne semble
s’appliquer avant tout aux Etats membres
d’aujourd’hui.
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